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Dallas Burtraw and Bill Shobe 
Abstract 
This paper describes the nature of inter-jurisdictional relations as they may exist under a federal 
cap-and-trade program and provides background on the current climate-related activities by state and 
local governments. State and local governments are uniquely positioned to implement many aspects of an 
overall climate strategy, and an important question is whether the price signal from a cap-and-trade 
program (or a tax) would be a sufficient incentive to do so. The paper examines alternative types of 
relationships between different levels of government when an agency problem exists, wherein 
information or incentives for action are not perfectly aligned. 
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State and Local Climate Policy under a National Emissions Floor 
Dallas Burtraw and Bill Shobe 
Introduction 
Climate change is a global problem and its solution will require international cooperation 
and coordination. That would seem to make climate change a problem that is particularly well 
suited for policy at the national level. However, in the U.S. and in some other nations including 
Australia and Canada, state or provincial and local governments have been very active in 
developing policy. Seemingly the manifest level of concern by state and local governments 
would contribute to achieving a policy outcome, but it also amplifies the challenges associated 
with cooperation and coordination.  
In a federal system, the state or provincial levels of government are subsidiary to national 
government, and similarly local governments are subsidiary to state governments, although 
specific authority and responsibility are often reserved for each entity. In the U.S., the 
constitution and its subsequent interpretation allow for the national government to preempt 
activities by state and local government. However, lower levels of government also play an 
important role in determining environmental outcomes through their planning and permitting 
functions. The likely advent of a federal climate policy has engendered an intense policy debate 
over the role of the states.  Given the federal structure of the U.S. government, and indeed of 
most governments around the world, national climate policies must take into account the division 
of roles and responsibilities between different levels of government. Therefore an important 
question in addressing climate change is the determination of the ability of state and local 
governments to contribute to policy solutions, as well as the incentive for them to do so. 
The leading approach to climate policy in the U.S. and in much of the world is emissions 
cap and trade. This approach would limit the total quantity of emissions that would be allowable 
during each compliance period, but would allow flexibility as to where and when those 
emissions would occur. A limit on the total quantity of emissions would introduce a scarcity 
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value on the ability to emit, and that value would be reflected in the market price of tradable 
emissions allowances. 
Two concerns immediately arise pertaining to the role of state and local governments. 
First, if the national government introduces a market for emissions allowances, then activities of 
lower levels of government such as restrictions on emissions could interfere with that market. 
This concern may lead policy makers to want to limit the options of state and local governments. 
A second concern is that an emissions cap effectively is an emissions floor. That is, by 
specifying a quantity at a higher-level jurisdiction and making it tradable the emissions cap 
specifies not just the maximum, but also the minimum amount of emissions that can occur. 
Under an emissions constraint, reductions in emissions by one party make possible additional 
emissions by another party. The existence of an emission floor may undermine the incentive for 
state and local governments to adopt measures that may contribute to local emissions reductions 
because leakage of emissions to other jurisdictions covered under the cap would be 100 percent. 
One might rightfully ask why the states should have any role in achieving a social 
optimum under a federal greenhouse gas (GHG) policy. An obvious consideration is that 
controlling GHG emissions is very close to a pure global public good. Although attempts to 
reduce GHG emissions appear to have originated with local and state governments, but once the 
federal government has acted and adopted comprehensive policy that arguably balances benefits 
and costs from the national perspective, is there any virtue in enabling lower-level jurisdictions 
to adopt additional measures affecting the policy outcome? It might seem that enabling them to 
do so would inefficiently raise the overall cost of the policy and upset the balancing at the 
national level. Furthermore, in the eyes of some, limitations on state and local action may 
enhance climate policy by reducing transaction costs and contributing to ease of compliance by 
firms engaged in economic activity that reaches across state and local boundaries. 
Reaction from a state perspective might be that the federal government cannot be 
assumed to achieve a proper balancing of benefits and costs or to be able to adjust to new 
information, and lower-level jurisdictions may provide important impetus to do so. Perhaps a 
more profound perspective is to recognize the compound layers of agency that exist between 
national-level policy and local decision makers. Information asymmetries result from these 
layers of agency, meaning that a cost-effective outcome is dependent on decentralized policies 
and behavior. The compound agency between national and local policy may seriously erode 
incentives that flow from national policy, including market-based policies. The possibility that a 
national cap and trade program may erode the ability or the incentive for state and local action is Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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of concern because their activities are important to achieving overall emissions reductions at 
least cost.  
This paper describes the nature of inter-jurisdictional relations, as they may exist under a 
federal cap-and-trade program. Second, the paper provides background on the current climate-
related activities by state and local governments, with a special focus on the U.S. setting. State 
and local governments are uniquely positioned to implement many aspects of an overall climate 
strategy, and an important question is whether the price signal from a cap and trade program (or 
a tax) would be a sufficient incentive to do so. Third, the paper examines alternative types of 
relationships between different levels of government when an agency problem exists, wherein 
information or incentives for action are not perfectly aligned. 
In brief, we conclude that an emissions cap, serving also as an emissions floor, may 
preempt many of the type of activities by state and local government that would otherwise help 
the national level government achieve climate-related goals. Economic analyses almost 
uniformly argue that technological innovation is the key to achieving greenhouse gas emissions, 
but most commentators have focused almost exclusively on engineering advances at the point of 
combustion of fossil fuels. Innovation also may be required in providing the infrastructure that 
governs a variety of ways that people live and interact. This kind of innovation occurs at the state 
and local government level and incentives to pursue such innovative measures may be weakened 
importantly under a national emissions floor. Finally, we describe some architectural features of 
cap-and-trade policy that can help to enhance the ability and incentive for state and local 
governments to innovate under a national emissions cap and trade program.   
National Climate-Policy Federalism under a Quantity-Based Emissions Target 
Section 8 of Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the “commerce clause” gives the federal 
government the right to regulate trade with other nations, with Indian tribes and among the 
states.  On its face, this language gives the federal government the power to actively control 
commerce between a state and any other jurisdiction.  The first implication of this language is 
that the federal government has broad, plenary power to regulate commerce.  As it has been 
interpreted, this clause implicitly grants the federal government the power to control matters that, 
while internal to a state, may affect commerce between a state and other states, countries or 
Indian tribes.  In addition, the “supremacy clause” in Article VI, clause 2, provides that federal 
law overrides any state law that is in conflict with valid federal legislation.  Congress may 
specifically preempt state authority in matters within its plenary power, or preemption is implied Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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if state laws are in actual conflict with federal action under the commerce clause (Nowak et al. 
1978). 
The introduction of a quantity constraint for emissions may introduce another type of 
preemption by effectively undermining the ability of state or local governments to affect the 
outcome to affect the emissions outcome. The basic architecture of a national emissions cap and 
trade program is to establish a national emissions floor. That is, by enabling a specific quantity of 
emissions, it specifies the minimum as well as the maximum emissions. For a state with citizen 
preferences favoring a stricter cap, spending more for emission reductions would provide an 
opportunity for increased emissions in another locality.  Only retiring allowances would lower 
aggregate emissions.  But efforts by some states to retire additional allowances would raise the 
marginal cost of emission reductions for the entire country and would be fought by other 
jurisdictions that would see their costs rise. 
State-level activities may be affected by a national emissions floor in two ways. First, the 
potential redundancy of programs can have profound legal and economic effects, and second, 
duplicative programs may blur responsibility for myriad regulatory activities that are the 
traditional domain of state and local governments. We discuss each of these perspectives in turn. 
The Fate of State Emissions Cap-and-Trade Programs 
McGuinness and Ellerman (2007) and Stavins (2007) have worked through the cases in 
which state imposed emissions caps might interact with a national cap-and-trade program. Two 
factors that affect the outcome are the relative stringency of the two programs and their scope of 
coverage. If a state program is less stringent than a federal program for the set of sources that it 
regulates, the shadow value (allowance price) of the emissions constraint in the state would be 
zero and the state program would have no effect on behavior. In fact, RGGI anticipates such an 
outcome explicitly in its memorandum of understanding.
1  
If the state program is more stringent, it will impose additional costs on sources in the 
state and will lead to lower emissions in the state, but there will be no change in emissions at the 
national level. If the state program has a broader scope of coverage than the national program, 
then the outcome will depend on the relative marginal costs of covered sources.  
                                                 
1 “When a federal program is proposed, the Signatory States will advocate for a federal program that rewards states 
that are first movers. If such a federal program is adopted, and it is determined to be comparable to this Program, the 
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There are also ways that the national and state programs might interact with respect to the 
timing of emissions. The value of banking under a state program would be affected by the 
expectation of how a bank might be treated in the future. Congressional discussions (and 
awareness of the 20 senatorial votes representing the RGGI region) suggest that the intent of the 
proposed Lieberman-Warner legislation in 2008 would have provided credit for early reductions 
equivalent to the value of allowances in the RGGI bank. In contrast, as noted below, there is to 
be no early reduction credit for state-level reductions under caps under a federal program in 
Australia. In that case, compliance entities have a reduced incentive to make reductions in the 
near term that might contribute to the allowance bank. 
Federalism under Price-Based Emissions Policy 
The same issues do not arise under a national tax on emissions.  A jurisdiction with a 
greater willingness to pay for emission reductions than the level at which the tax is set could pay 
something more than the tax by establishing local policies more stringent than those implied by 
the current tax rate. In this case, unlike under a quantity constraint, net reductions in emissions 
can be achieved without raising compliance costs in other jurisdictions.  In an economic 
framework, one should note that if the tax were set at a social optimum from the national 
perspective, such a policy would result in a loss of social surplus since the value of the resources 
used for the additional GHG reductions would be more than the social value of the incremental 
reduction in GHG emissions.  
The establishment and enforcement of a national floor on greenhouse gas emissions does 
not itself require additional state or local mandates or special state prerogatives to lower the cap. 
The implementation of a cost-effective emission reduction plan, and hence the speed with which 
we are willing to reduce emissions, does depend on carefully chosen supplemental policies at the 
federal, state and local levels. A quantity instrument (cap) has different incentives for state and 
local governments than a price instrument (tax). The cap may preserve many motivations for 
state and local action to reduce emissions, and the introduction of a price on emissions will 
introduce a new motivation for states to implement many cost-reducing strategies, but the 
emissions cap erodes the ability and the incentive for state and local government to directly 
affect the emissions outcome.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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Agency Relationships Affect Efficiency of Market Signals in Traditional Areas of 
State and Local Authority  
State and local governments conduct a variety of functions that contribute to 
environmental outcomes. More specifically, local authorities will make decisions with profound 
environmental consequences that federal authorities could not possibly make based on their 
available information. For example, local authorities will decide whether streets are aligned so 
that houses achieve maximum solar gain, and eaves are designed so that at specific latitudes they 
let in maximum light in the winter and shade in the summer. They will decide building standards 
that determine whether glazing is optimized, and landscaping organized to buffer against winds. 
They decide about ordinances or covenants that may disallow outdoor clotheslines. As they did 
in ancient Rome, local governments also decide about protection of solar access. They decide 
whether asphalt surfaces are minimized to lessen heat gain, and importantly, where people live in 
relation to their work. The sum of these activities will determine the infrastructure of 
communities for the next century, and the influence on the global climate, in the aggregate, is 
profound. 
The planners and policy makers in local jurisdictions who determine the outcome of these 
issues are insulated from the incentives of price signals stemming from the national emissions 
quantity constraint.  Consider the example of a housing developer who ignores both energy cost 
and consumption of proposed residential units because of the likelihood that potential 
homebuyers do not consider these in home purchase decisions. While the price signal from the 
national policy is likely to be ignored by the developer, local policy makers can invoke stronger 
policies to govern their behavior.  
A cost-effective GHG reduction policy based on a federal cap will require a balancing of 
interests between levels of government.  State and local policies may unduly interfere with the 
performance of the national market, or they may be the source of cost-reducing innovations in 
the provision of infrastructure that governs the way that people live.
2  
                                                 
2 A forum where innovations in local regulatory policy aimed at transit, energy, water, agriculture and building 
sectors are explored is the Applied Solutions Workshop, a proceeding involving representatives from 
nongovernmental agencies and local level agencies sharing experience with policies aimed at reducing GHG 
emissions. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
7 
Background on What States Are Doing 
State, provincial and local governments have adopted a variety of climate policies to fill 
the vacuum created at the federal level. Below we outline the targets and timeframes of these 
policies, as well as any significant mechanisms for cost containment, allowance distribution, or 
coordination between sub-national and national governments. 
Beginning outside the U.S., British Columbia instituted a broad-based tax on combustion 
of fossil fuels that begins at $10 (Canadian) per metric ton CO2 in 2008 and grows to $30 in 
2012. Revenue is fully recycled back to consumers in income tax reductions, progressively 
scaled for various income levels, and rising over time from a 2 percent reduction in personal 
income taxes in 2008 to 5 percent in 2009 on the first $70,000 in earnings. Low-income families 
earn an additional annual (escalating) dividend that began at $100 per adult and $30 per child.  
In Australia, the federal government’s GHG policy follows state initiatives. The 
government white paper (December 2008) provided guidelines for a program would cap 
covering roughly 75% of Australia’s GHG emissions. Under these guidelines, states would be 
encouraged to discontinue any market-based programs and would receive no early action credits 
for their efforts.
3The national program aims to cut emissions by 60 percent from 2000 levels by 
2050, as well as to set interim emission reduction goals starting for year 2011. If implemented as 
suggested, cost containment and assistance would be provided.  
There are widespread GHG reductions efforts by local and state governments across the 
U.S. At the local level, over 916 Mayors have voluntarily committed their cities to emission 
reductions outlined in the Kyoto Protocol (7 percent below 1990 levels by 2012). This effort 
began in 2005 when the U.S. mayors Climate Protection Agreement was passed unanimously by 
the Conference of Mayors.  In this agreement Mayors also agree to urge state and federal policy 
makers to enact broader climate legislation.  
In addition, a number of states have passed legislation varying from commitments of 
intent to reduce emissions to state laws that will precipitate specific regulations; some of which 
are pending. For example, the Florida legislature is considering legislation that could establish as 
early as 2010, an electricity sector cap and trade program, to reduce emissions to 2000 levels by 
                                                 
3 For example, the Victorian government has capped emissions at one electricity generator and offered support for 
low emissions technology. The state of Western Australia has also set its own GHG targets and plans for developing 
additional GHG reduction policies. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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2017, to 1990 levels by 2025, and to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. Also, proposed 
legislation supported by the governor in Maryland would require the state to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by 25 percent from 2006 levels by 2020. 
The most active state jurisdiction has been California, a member of the WCI. The most 
visible legislation was the Global Warming Solutions Act, which requires the state to reduce 
aggregate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. Although the Act was nearly 
silent on the mechanism by which the emissions reductions are to be achieved, this is a familiar 
procedure for regulatory policy in California, where sweeping authority traditionally has been 
given to state agencies to decide regulations to achieve the state’s environmental goals.  At the 
end of 2008, the Air Resources Board (ARB) adopted a scoping plan that includes an extensive 
list of standards and measures to be implemented in the state. In addition, the state is moving 
forward with the development of a cap-and-trade program that tentatively is scheduled to take 
effect in 2012. 
California has also passed other high-profile regulations and legislation. It has leading 
energy efficiency standards for buildings, appliance efficiency standards, and a requirement to 
consider efficiency first in the loading order of electricity supply. In 2005, the California Public 
Utilities Commission adopted a rule requiring investor-owned utilities to use a greenhouse gas 
“adder” for long-term planning and resource procurement.  Senate Bill 1368 sets a greenhouse 
gas performance standard to ensure that new long-term financial commitments in baseload power 
plants by electric load-serving entities that applies whether the power is generated within state 
borders or imported from plants in other states.  
In 2002, California adopted vehicle emission standards under Assembly Bill 1493 that 
requires a 30 percent reduction in GHG emissions from new vehicles by 2016. Thirteen other 
states have since committed to adopting this standard. To implement the law, California requires 
a waiver from the federal Environmental Protection Agency, which is still pending. In addition 
the state has moved forward with development of a cradle-to-grave low-carbon fuel standard for 
transportation fuels sold in California, with the goal of reducing the carbon content of passenger-
vehicle fuels in the state at least 10 percent by 2020.   
California also has been active in developing guidelines for land use changes. Signed into 
law in late September, 2008, SB 375 mandates that the California ARB develop regional 
greenhouse gas emission reductions from passenger and light truck vehicles for the years 2020 
and 2035. Metropolitan planning organizations throughout California are required to submit a 
“sustainable communities strategy” demonstrating a plan to reduce vehicle miles traveled in their Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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region and achieve state targets. The ARB can accept or reject each region’s plan for achieving 
its target, and incentives are attached to some provisions, for example, some transportation 
planning and programming activities planned in 2012 or after must be consistent with the SCS in 
order to obtain funding. Also, builders with projects consistent with SCS will not be subject to 
environmental reviews under the California Environmental Quality Act.  
California is also a member of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI). Established in 2007, 
it currently comprises seven U.S. states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon and 
Washington, Utah and Montana) and four Canadian Provinces (British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Ontario, and Quebec). The WCI plans for implementation in 2012, covering about 90% of the 
regions GHG emissions, and aims to bring total emissions to 15 percent below 2005 levels by 
2020. The WCI Work Plan for 2009-10 outlines proposed regulatory design elements to be 
developed including unlimited banking, offset and early action credits. Each partner state would 
distribute their own allowances, and some from each partner will be set aside for strategic energy 
initiatives and adaptation.  
Also signed in 2007 was the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, involving six 
Midwestern states and the Manitoba Province in Canada, with the intent of launching a regional 
cap-and-trade program.
4 Each member state and province is responsible for developing 
complimentary policies to help meet targets to be identified and will participate in a formal 
emissions registry, agreeing in principle to the potential implementation of a regional cap-and-
trade program.
5 A draft final rule outlining target timeframes and policy mechanisms is expected 
in September this year. 
The most advanced regional effort is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
which was the first mandatory, market-based effort in the U.S. The initiative took effect in 
January 2009 involving ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states. It aims to reduce CO2 
emissions from power generation 10% by 2018. Although the emissions target is modest, the 
initiative has had substantial influence in its design. Allocation decisions rest at the state level. 
Roughly 85 percent of emissions allowances are to be auctioned and two auctions have already 
                                                 
4 On November 15, 2007, the agreement was signed by governors of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, 
and Wisconsin, and by the Premier of Manitoba. Governors of Indiana, Ohio and South Dakota sign on as observers, 
and were joined later the Province of Ontario. 
5 Draft recommendations include suggested reduction targets of 15, 20, and 25 percent below 2005 levels by 2020, 
and 60 to 80% below 2005 levels by 2050. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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taken place. At least 25 percent of allowance value is to be dedicated to strategic energy 
initiatives at the state level.  
The actions by sub-federal governments are not insignificant in number, scope, and 
possibly, in their abilities to reduce GHG emissions. The next section discusses the issues that 
arise when we question how to incorporate these players and their actions into a national climate 
policy. 
Several Historic Perspectives on the Role of States 
The roles and responsibilities of state and local government are determined, among other 
things, by legal institutions, tradition, the availability of special knowledge and expertise, 
variations in preferences, and by the incentives for action implicit under any federal policy. 
There is virtue to national policy and potential inefficiency in decentralized policy. However, 
many types of decisions are the traditional domain of state and local government, due in part to 
the origins of common law and due to their ability to take advantage of differences in local 
conditions. The introduction of emissions cap and trade has potentially profound implications for 
the evolution of authority for environmental policy between the federal and state levels of 
government in the U.S.    
Potential Virtues of National Policy  
A widely recognized justification for national policy is that it reconciles differences 
among states and can thereby lower the costs of commerce that crosses state lines. In addition, 
national-level policies and agencies are expected to have better information and resources to 
develop and implement policy than do state governments. Lastly, a national cap might help 
answer questions about the enforceability of many sub-national caps that would otherwise have 
to rely on civil law of contracts for enforcement, especially in the face of any interstate 
commerce issues and without the ability to engage in international negotiations.  
Local Experiments Follow Local Interests 
It is also widely recognized that national policy makers can benefit from policy 
innovation among the states. By testing many independently developed policies, a system of 
decentralized policy development might quicken the development of new, cost-reducing policies.  
Unfortunately, using states as policy laboratories is not without its difficulties. Competition 
among the states may lead states to choose policies that undermine, rather than support, the goal 
of cost-effective emission reductions at the national level. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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Local policies on climate change will often be driven in part by local interests not 
necessarily related to climate change.  For example, states may be tempted to subsidize the cost 
of GHG emissions if the net economic benefits of doing so are less than the cost of the subsidy.  
This action by states reduces the marginal incentive for reducing emissions by emitters and will 
generally be associated with increased overall cost of meeting a federal cap.  In an oddly 
perverse example, the state of Tennessee recently lured a German manufacturer of 
polycrystalline silicon, used in producing solar cells, to locate its manufacturing facility in the 
state by promising to cover the cost of any future federal programs that would raise the cost of 
GHG emissions.  This policy eliminates the exposure of the manufacturer to the incentives to 
reduce GHG emissions provided by the federal program in return for investment in the state. In 
general, one would expect to observe differences in state policies that reflect differences in the 
expected local gains, the local distribution of those gains, and the relative influence of various 
interests at the local level. 
Policy Experiments Create Entitlements that Are Hard to Eliminate 
It naturally follows that once a local policy has been established it will likely be hard to 
change because those receiving the benefits of the current policy will be willing to pay through 
rent-preserving behavior to retain the benefit. Their willingness to pay will be directly related to 
the size of the benefit received. This implies that policy experiments have a natural stickiness or 
inertia; they are hard to eliminate once they are in place. Policy inertia arises from the tendency 
of beneficiaries to view the benefits from the policy as an entitlement: every public policy is an 
entitlement to someone. This policy inertia creates yet another divergence between the ideal 
laboratory model and actual policy development by the states.  Policy inertia and policy capture 
by interested groups has been amply demonstrated in many areas of regulatory policy (Posner 
1974; Stigler 1971). 
Experimentation Implies Learning from Mistakes 
“Follow-the-leader” policy development occurs frequently, where one state or a few 
states implement new policies, and these new policies diffuse across other states often before a 
careful evaluation can be made of the true impact of the new policies. Policy is infrequently 
evaluated ex post and this is true especially at the local level, where the significant resources 
needed for policy evaluation may not be available and patience may be lacking. Unfortunately, 
without undertaking analysis, state policy makers cannot be in a position to make a fully 
informed decision about whether a policy experiment has promoted the intended goal and, if so, 
whether it has been worth the cost. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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Motivations for State and Local Leadership Persist Even under an Emissions Cap  
There are a variety of motivations for state and local governments to continue to play an 
active role in achieving climate goals even under a national emissions floor. One motivation is 
simply to “get one’s house in order.” Many citizens active at the local level view climate policy 
in an ethical context, and local political action provides a way to do one’s part to help address the 
problem.   
A second motivation is simply to serve one’s constituents by helping to reduce the cost 
and to help gain an advantageous position for one’s jurisdiction under the national policy. The 
price of an emissions allowance will trickle into the costs of doing business in a local jurisdiction 
and the extent to which that cost can be reduced provides the possibility of greater discretionary 
spending for the community. Furthermore, many climate-friendly policies also convey 
environmental amenities that can improve the quality of life. In a variety of ways, the decisions 
of state and local governments can help get their communities ready for the carbon-constrained 
age.  
Third, one can assume the perspective of a long time horizon in advocating for policies at 
the state and local level. Policy innovations may reduce the costs of achieving emissions 
reductions at the national level, enabling a dynamic process that might reduce the emissions cap 
over time. Measures to promote new technologies like a million solar roofs in California would 
perhaps lower average production costs and ultimately make it easier for the nation to achieve its 
emissions goals, or to lower the emissions floor in future decades. 
A question, to which we return, is whether these incentives are sufficient to achieve the 
kind of activity at the state and local level that satisfy national objectives. 
Cautionary Tales: Federal Action on Social and Economic Policy is a Two-Edged 
Sword 
As noted above, many motivations for local action remain under a national emissions 
constraint and many opportunities to affect local emissions retain their potency, even if the 
national level of emissions is not affected. However, it remains the case that the national 
emissions floor effectively preempts the ability of state and local government to implement 
policies that harvest additional emissions reductions at the national level. Historically, federal 
preemption in a domain where states have led has been a two-edged sword. 
For example, at the time of passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act, there were 17 states 
enforcing antitrust actions geared in particular at protecting local establishments from the Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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intrusions of national companies. A high school history text would characterize the Act as 
protecting against large companies, anticompetitive actions and robber barons. But, for two 
decades after its passage there was little action at the federal level enforcing the Act. Indeed it 
enabled the trusts that it was ostensibly intended to obstruct, by stripping the states of their 
ability to enforce their own laws. The Sherman Antitrust Act set the stage for expansive 
economic growth: a two-edged sword that was especially good for Sears Roebucks, and 
especially bad for local hardware stores.  
Another example would be the Occupational Health and Safety Act. Ostensibly it 
protects workers, but it is a two-edged sword as it also protects firms. OSHA exonerates a firm 
from liability for workplace injuries as long as it is not found negligent under OSHA standards. 
So, workers are stripped of the ability to sue their employer. And to some extent then, workplace 
standards and worker safety depends on the stringency of enforcement by the federal agency, 
which has waxed and waned over the years. 
History will view current activities about climate change as a social movement, and 
social movements have a life cycle. A federal emissions constraint that sets an emissions floor 
may be environmental victory, but it may remove fuel from the local fire for addressing climate 
change. For those who see local action as an out-of-control prairie fire, this is a good thing. For 
those who see local action as the potential rejoinder to national indifference or corruption, or 
perhaps a place for personal redemption, then a federal emissions floor is a difficult compromise. 
It may be early in the lifecycle of the social movement to weaken or remove the ability or 
incentive for local action. 
The Historic Erosion of State Authority in Environment Policy 
For as long as environmental policy was viewed primarily as an issue of what regulations 
to apply to the use of the air and water, the value of environmental resources remained implicit 
and the issue of ownership of resources did not arise.  Rather the discussion was in terms of what 
level of government had the power to establish and enforce regulatory standards. 
With the advent of environmental policies such as allowance trading that are based on 
establishing market-like incentives for users of the air and water, the resources are transformed 
into an asset with a stream of valuable monetary returns.  The power to regulate now implies the 
power to determine the disposition of the stream of valuable returns on the regulated activity. 
The issue of control is now also an issue of income. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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Although no one seemed to remark on it at the time, the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments transferred a valuable ownership interest from the states to the federal government 
by transferring the right to allocate the economic value of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from 
sources covered by the law. Previously states had the authority through permitting, etc. to 
determine the assignment of the implicit value. The 1990 Amendments created an asset with 
substantial market value and gave the asset to the regulated firms free-of-charge.  An asset that 
had been held in trust by state government, for all intents and purposes, became the property of 
the federal government.   
The SO2 program is the only example to date of a cap and trade program where this value 
has been usurped by the federal government. In the NOx SIP Call, or in RGGI, or in the EU ETS 
or in the many local trading programs the allocation decision remains with the state or member 
state. 
Secondly, traditional conservatives, who believe in the devolution of regulatory authority 
to the local level where possible, should take special note of this point in history. Local planning 
authority draws on the law of public nuisance with its roots all the way back in common law. In 
the last two decades, some commentators have advocated further devolution of parts of federal 
environmental law to the state level.
6 The introduction of a federal emissions quantity could 
effectively elevate authority for many otherwise traditionally local regulatory activities to the 
federal level. For example, area emission sources from agriculture, forestry and land use 
planning may offer low cost emission reductions that are unlikely to be directly covered under 
the cap. These activities may qualify as valuable offsets. Qualification for offsets may involve 
certification of specific practices within a regulatory process that is elevated to the federal level 
in an unprecedented manner. Hence, the institution of a federal emission floor, with federal 
guidelines and processes to certify offsets and incentives to local governments to implement 
approved measures may suggest the opening of influence into what has for centuries been in the 
local domain.   
Remedies to the Incentive Problem under “Floor and Trade” 
For state and local governments to play a strong role in helping the nation to achieve its 
climate goals they need both the ability and the incentive to affect the emissions outcome. The 
                                                 
6 Hecht 2004. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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ability to affect the emissions outcome is tied directly to the ability for state actions to meet or 
exceed the outcome that would occur under business as usual. Whether these governments act 
forcefully to innovate in their domains of influence will depend on the incentives they have to do 
so. 
The Ability of States to Meet or Exceed 
In principle, state and local policy is susceptible to regulatory capture in a symmetric 
way. They could be persuaded to adopt policies that promote local commercial interests that 
undermine the overarching national goal, or that reinforce it. However, the principle of meet or 
exceed is not symmetric. The federal commitment to climate change is not intended to be the 
sum of local commitments. Federal climate policy will attempt to overcome the current inertia in 
the economy by reducing emissions. State and local policies can help reduce the cost of 
achieving that outcome where they provide innovated solutions that are not attainable directly by 
the federal government. 
For over forty years, Congress has generally utilized “floor preemption” in environmental 
policy, meaning that a federal minimum standard is set but states may exceed this minimum 
(Andreen et al. 2008). Federal minimums are useful in the case of transboundary pollution, but 
more stringent state regulations are in no way detrimental to this effort. Also the concept of meet 
or exceed allows for flexibility in the face of various sources of state-by-state heterogeneity. 
Such heterogeneity is a primary justification for cap and trade programs. Specifically, they allow 
heterogeneous state and local governments to adopt supplemental policies that are not covered 
under the uniform emissions allowance price. There may be architectural fixes to a national 
emissions trading policy to allow for meet or exceed policies at the state and local level. One 
suggestion is to allow states to require the surrender of an additional fraction of a federal 
allowance for emissions in that state. This ultimately allows for a stricter state target integrated 
into a federal program. However, it would deny the state any possible value stream from the 
auctioning of allowances because those revenues would accrue to the federal government. In 
addition, state efforts may be anticipated and it is not clear whether that would lead to a tighter or 
looser cap at the national level. 
An approach mentioned by Stavins would be a carve out for states that choose not to join 
the federal program, as long as those states adopt policies that meet or exceed the federal policy. 
Moreover, in that case a state or group of states would be able to retain authority to assign the 
economic value created by introducing scarcity on CO2 through the allocation of emission 
allowances and the permitting of related activity. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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The Incentive to Meet or Exceed 
How can the federal government provide incentives for state and local governments to 
innovate in their traditional domains? One approach that was embodied in the Lieberman-Warner 
proposal in 2008 (S.2191) would directly provide incentives for innovation in land use, 
transportation and energy efficiency through the award of allowances to the leader states where 
such value has traditionally resided.  
The ultimate draft of the proposal introduced a political compromise that illustrates what 
may be a Faustian bargain for state and local governments. The “substitute amendment” to the 
Boxer-Lieberman-Warner proposal (S.3036) would not give out allowances to leader states if 
they institute a cap-and-trade program independent of the federal program. 
Several authors have suggested “cooperative federalism” that would set standards 
federally but allow the states to develop implementing policies.
7 These examples fall outside the 
emissions-trading program, except to the extent that they might be used to govern the 
apportionment of allowances or allowance value to the states. An example is the mechanism of 
state implementation plans; however, these plans are not known for their tendency to reward 
innovation. Generally federal approval of the plans hinges on the use of pre-approved measures 
and standards.  
The criteria for the award of allowances to leader states are a list of specific measures that 
govern the behavior of the state and local governments rather than focus on the outcome of their 
actions. In this way, the award embodies a criteria-driven kind of command-and-control thinking 
that might seem contrary to incentive-based orientation of the cap-and-trade approach. 
A hybrid approach involving specific incentives for a broad set of policies and standards 
has been used in transportation policy under three major federal transportation bills in 1991, 
1998 and 2003. For example, the “value pricing pilot program” in 1998 provided up-front 
funding to support implementation of road pricing. The 2003 legislation established a ridership-
based “performance incentive program.” It specified that in order to receive funds, a state must 
have a process in place to analyze highway safety problems and must produce a list of projects to 
be funded.  
                                                 
7 McKinstry, Dernbach and Peterson (2007), and Andreen et al. (2008). Kaswan (2008), Doremus and Hanemann 
(2008). Litz (2008) suggests this approach especially for mobile sources. Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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A different approach to provide incentives for meet or exceed that rewards outcomes 
rather than actions might be to associate to states an expected annual rate of progress devolved 
from the national annual rate of progress represented in the national emissions goals. The annual 
rate of progress denominated in emissions per capita or emissions per unit of economic activity 
would provide an outcome-oriented incentive while preserving for state and local governments 
the greatest possible decision-making authority.  
The concept of annual rate of progress is a familiar one under Section 171 the Clean Air 
Act. “Reasonable further progress” is used to measure progress in areas that are out of attainment 
with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards. If a jurisdiction fails to meet an annual rate of 
progress (for example, a 3 percent reduction in the difference between air quality and the 
national standards) it would trigger additional sanctions from the federal government, such as 
freezing of federal highway funds. 
 Failing to meet an assigned annual rate of progress under federal climate policy could 
result in a reduction in the award of allowances to the state, implying a reduction of revenues 
associated with the sale of allowances or value associated with their allocation. In contrast, an 
incentive for exceptional performance might allow for expanded awards to states that exceed 
their annual rate of progress.  
Conclusion: Towards Global Climate Federalism  
Democratic governments have their disadvantages. The expression of ideas contrary to 
national policy can undermine or raise the cost of the policy. Multiple layers of government 
within a democratic system can amplify this effect because it provides multiple points of entry 
for competing ideas and moreover it provides decentralized policy handles that can be affected 
by local constituencies. 
A familiar feature of national policy within a federalist system of government is 
preemption of actions by lower levels of government that may contradict or interfere with the 
policy at the national level. Emissions cap and trade introduces an unfamiliar type of effective 
preemption by rendering less effective many of the types of policies that are the traditional 
domain of state and local government, to the extent that these policies can have no direct affect 
on the environmental outcome.  
This paper argues that the activities of state and local government are important to 
achieving policies aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and especially to reducing the cost 
of achieving national-level goals. These actors are uniquely situated to affect the outcome Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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because each has access to unique information that is not available at the national level. 
Moreover, whereas economists typically argue that innovation is essential to helping society 
achieve emissions reductions, state and local governments provide the venue for innovation in 
policy that will determine most directly the way that people interact with their environment and 
the associated use of energy. Therefore, it seems essential for climate policy to be cost effective, 
and to maximize the opportunity and incentive for innovation in the activities of state and local 
governments so that they can contribute to overall emissions reductions. 
The resolution of environmental federalism within national governments may presage 
that for national governments in international climate negotiations. A major question facing the 
international community is whether international institutions should define specific actions of 
national governments in the effort to arrest climate change. Conversely, to what extent can 
commitments be tied to outcomes and performance rather than specific actions? Shall actions be 
governed by specific language of multinational agreements? Or, can bilateral agreements outside 
the multinational framework be the basis for achieving emissions reduction outcomes. The 
national level decisions about the relationships between different levels of government offer a 
microcosm of the issues that are likely to face the international community in the next decades.   Resources for the Future  Burtraw and Shobe 
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